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Arab springs, European 
strings 
Over the past four months the 
sequence and the combination of 
popular demonstrations across the 
Southern Mediterranean and the 
wider Middle East region have been 
described as: uprising, revolt, 
revolution, rebellion, awakening. 
Such a semantic breadth shows how 
difficult it still is to characterize the 
events that have been unfolding ever 
since last December.  
The latest linguistic consensus is on 
“Arab spring”, a definition that 
conveys a sense of cultural geography, 
a feeling of seasonal renewal and the 
impression that a long winter of 
stagnation is gone for good.  
There have indeed been several 
common features among the various 
“springs” that have shaken the Arab 
world over the past 20 weeks, 
starting with the domino effect 
rooted in comparable economic and 
political discontent across the region 
and spread by old and new media 
(from Al Jazeera to Google, 
Facebook and Twitter). 
Similar socio-demographic features – 
with an overwhelmingly young, 
relatively well-educated but also 
dramat ica l ly  under-employed 
population – went hand in hand with 
various autocratic political structures 
in which ageing (and often ailing) 
leaders presided over massively 
corrupt and repressive regimes. The 
triggering factors may have been 
contingent and country-specific (a 
spike in food prices, one tax too 
many) but the underlying causes were 
well discernible all across the region.  
It used to be customary for Middle 
East pundits to wonder what “the 
Arab street” thought and talked about, 
as a sort of whispering crowd whose 
moods and opinions constituted a side 
show to the main drama on stage. 
Now we do have a clearer idea of 
what the Arab streets – and especially 
squares – may think. But what they 
may get in the end, both individually 
and collectively, is much less clear. 
From the scent of jasmine to the 
stench of oil? 
To date, in fact, we have already 
witnessed at least three distinct lines 
of development on the ground:  
• relatively soft “regime change”, 
culminated with the departure/
resignation of the incumbent 
autocrat and the onset of a 
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democratic transition partly led by members 
of the previous elites (the “jasmine” 
revolution in Tunisia and the current situation 
in Egypt); 
• reforms and concessions from above, meant 
as a pre-emptive measure or as a first 
response to brewing discontent, with the 
ruling “royal” family remaining in charge or 
basically unchallenged (Morocco, Jordan, in 
part also Saudi Arabia); 
• the ugly ones, namely those situations in 
which massive violence has been used against 
demonstrators to fend off substantial reforms 
or “regime change”: while Libya is the most 
conspicuous case in point, Bahrain, Yemen 
and now Syria also fall into this category. 
Each situation has been influenced by a number 
of variables: fragility/solidity of the State, ethnic/
tribal and religious cleavages, availability of key 
resources, strategic location, exposure to foreign 
influence and the media. Furthermore, some 
situations may still take a nicer direction (Yemen) 
while others may turn nastier or remain difficult 
to read (Algeria, the dog that did not bark). 
So, in fact, neither have we seen a linear negative 
trend since Ben Ali fled Tunisia, nor have we to 
expect an unstoppable democratization process 
throughout the Arab world. 2011 is definitely not 
1989. But neither is it 1979, with an immensely 
popular revolution in Tehran crushed by the 
subsequent involution of the Islamic regime.  
In the age of climate change, predicting the next 
seasons is nearly impossible. Yet Arab politics 
will definitely no longer be just a choice between 
authoritarian and corrupt rulers, on the one 
hand, and radical and violent Islamists, on the 
other. In turn, Western policy needs no longer 
be just a choice of the lesser evil – but neither 
should it become a race to pick winners. 
From surprise to reappraisal 
The initial reaction of the “West” to the Arab 
springs was one of embarrassment and surprise. 
The embarrassment was due to the longtime 
support given – albeit to different degrees of 
intensity and visibility – to the autocratic rulers 
contested in the Arab streets and squares. 
 
The surprise was largely due to the same cause. 
The Arab springs were broadly predictable, or at 
least imaginable, had someone connected all the 
dots properly: the basic information was there, 
and so were the symptoms. Yet this second 
“strategic surprise” in a decade had its roots in 
the filtres cognitifs that Western diplomatic and 
intelligence communities applied to the region, 
as Bruno Tertrais pointed out in “Le Monde” a 
few weeks ago. We did not see it coming because 
the status quo – however precarious – broadly 
suited existing policy priorities, and nobody felt 
like (or dared) rocking the boat. 
Ever since, both Americans and Europeans have 
tried to regroup and catch up. Different 
“springs”, in fact, have required pulling different 
“strings” in order to prevent or contain violence 
and help channel events towards acceptable 
outcomes. At the same time, it is difficult to deal 
with each situation separately: spill-over effects 
are evident, and so is the risk of adopting double 
standards. 
European governments have also been 
confronted with the specific challenges 
represented by different internal attitudes 
towards the region as well as uneven national 
exposure to migrants. 
For its part, the EU has started reviewing its 
previous policies towards the Southern 
“neighbourhood” by emphasizing, in particular, 
the need to engage with civil societies; to offer 
better tailored and more relevant incentives and 
rewards to each neighbour (the “more for more” 
approach); and to reconsider the way in which 
“conditionality” – a notion inextricably linked to 
the EU accession process, now likely to be 
rebranded as “mutual accountability” – is to be 
applied to countries that are never to become 
part of (or just like) “us”. 
The Commission released a first Communication 
to this end – jointly with the EEAS – in early 
March. A second one on the ENP proper is 
scheduled for May. This issue of BEPA Monthly 
Brief aims to provide additional food for 
thought, in the awareness that this is very much 
policy (and especially history) in the making. 
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The EU must demonstrate it is a serious player 
by contributing to a new environment in the Me-
diterranean and fostering pluralism and human 
rights in North Africa and the Middle East. Any 
new strategy to this end must combine a long-
term vision of the Euro-Mediterranean space 
with short- and medium-term policies that help 
the uprisings become irreversible.  
In March a joint Commission-EEAS Communi-
cation illustrated a first step in rebranding the 
“more for more” concept: those countries which 
carry out free and fair elections will receive more 
of what Catherine Ashton called the three “Ms”: 
Money, Market access, Mobility. The ideas, incen-
tives and approach are not new: the key is the 
“more”. Conditionality will indeed need to be refi-
ned in order to take into account the changing 
situation and reward those countries committed 
to building more representative political systems. 
Still, there are problems. The entry benchmark for 
this new “partnership” is high. Tunisia and Egypt 
have never experienced free and fair elections and 
have chosen to vote soon for their parliaments (in 
July and September, respectively). The timing for 
the elections is still a disputed matter in Egypt, as 
it gives little time for the new parties to consoli-
date. Free and fair elections would require pro-
found reforms of the media and new laws on po-
litical association and expression, electoral consti-
tuencies, supervision and conduct of polls – a 
process unlikely to be consolidated before the 
vote. And the new parliaments will have the cru-
cial task of redrafting the countries’ constitutions, 
including those laws and rules that would notably 
enable free and fair elections. 
Moreover, the trouble with the incentives lies in 
their delivery. The EU has been protective of its 
markets, has committed next to nothing in terms 
of resources (despite the calls for a “Marshall 
Plan”), and has been asking Tunis to block a few 
thousand irregular migrants when the region is 
managing hundreds of thousands displaced per-
sons. The Communication is littered with ap-
peals to the Member States to replenish near-
empty funds and to allow international financial 
institutions increase their spending and lending 
for these countries. 
In other words, political honesty would require 
that the three “Ms” were accompanied by as ma-
ny “IFs”: if the Member States were more gene-
rous; if they were less concerned with these limi-
ted migratory flows; and if they were prepared to 
extend the freedom of movement of goods to-
wards some countries in the South Mediterranean. 
The short and the long term 
Even if the EU were able to deliver on the pro-
mised incentives, however, its approach remains 
long-term. What has been entirely absent since 
Tunisians and Egyptians overthrew their rulers is 
short-term policies that could underpin the ma-
nagement of the crises at their height (as today’s 
response to Syria shows) and drive our engage-
ment once the provisional governments settle in. 
The EU has tools that can be of use in North 
Africa, such as technical assistance to prepare for 
the elections, capacity building in sub-state insti-
tutions and civil society, and experience with re-
forming police and the military. The forthcoming 
ENP review will put more emphasis on suppor-
ting civil society – a welcome development given 
that changes in the whole EU neighbourhood 
have resulted from social mobilisation. EU bud-
getary lines need to become more flexible to be 
able to deploy such tools at short notice. And 
short-term financial support to help the provisio-
nal governments assuage the consequences of 
the economic downturn of the past months 
would be further proof of our commitment. 
Most importantly, a political vision should un-
derpin all this. And it can only be developed by 
improving knowledge of the dynamics of change 
in North Africa by strengthening the EU Delega-
tions there; fostering coordination between 
Member States; connecting with local political 
actors; and engaging on step-by-step priorities to 
make sure that the uprisings pave the way to a 
new Mediterranean. 
1 Let us roll up our sleeves to shape a new Mediterranean  
By Rosa Balfour* 
* Rosa Balfour is Senior Policy Analyst at the European Policy Centre, Brussels  
bepa monthly brief 
April 2011 – Issue 46 
4 
Après des années de stagnation de la coopération 
euro-méditerranéenne, les révoltes arabes nous 
rappellent brutalement à la réalité politique de la 
région. Si le déclencheur immédiat du mouve-
ments est plutôt à identifier du côté des inégalités 
économiques et sociales (avec comme point de 
départ symbolique l’immolation du jeune Bouazi-
zi en Tunisie), le but des manifestants est bien en 
effet désormais de faire sauter le verrou politique 
qui bloque le changement depuis tant d’années 
dans les pays du périmètre arabe méditerranéen. 
L’urgence politique méditerranéenne, enfin ex-
posée dans toute sa clarté, n’est pas une surprise. 
L’aléa politique hante en effet depuis l’origine la 
politique méditerranéenne de l’Union, sous ses 
formes successives du Partenariat euro-
méditerranéen, de la Politique de Voisinage et de 
l’Union pour la Méditerranée. La stratégie des 
Européens a toujours été prise au piège d’un pa-
radoxe politique, car les finalités de l’Euromed, 
définies en 1995, sont bel et bien politiques : il 
s’agit de stabiliser et de pacifier un espace com-
mun, en privilégiant certes la voie du développe-
ment et de l’interdépendance économique. Mais 
ce sont précisément deux obstacles de nature 
politique qui ont le plus contrarié l’accomplisse-
ment des objectifs de Barcelone : la conflictualité 
endémique entre pays partenaires méditerra-
néens, d’une part, qui complique la mise en œu-
vre de projets multilatéraux à l’échelle régionale ; 
et la dérive autoritaire et clientéliste des régimes 
de la rive sud, d’autre part, qui empêche la juste 
répartition des fruits d’une croissance dont le 
frémissement était pourtant enfin perceptible à la 
veille des révolutions. 
De l’échec à l’espoir  
Les crises politiques majeures traversées au cours 
de la dernière décennie – le 11 septembre, puis 
les effets de l’intervention américaine en Irak – 
ont contribué à dégrader encore la qualité du lien 
euro-méditerranéen. L’Union européenne, qui 
s’annonçait dans les années 1990 comme un pro-
tagoniste majeur, bien qu’atypique, en Méditerra-
née, y est désormais perçue comme un interlocu-
teur lourd et dépourvu d’intentions claires, inca-
pable de résoudre les conflits ou de faire avancer 
les libertés, et cherchant à neutraliser tous les 
sujets politiques au risque de les voir pourrir. L’é-
chec de l’Union pour la Méditerranée (UM) a 
parfaitement illustré ce syndrome : théorique-
ment fondée sur l’évitement du politique – on ne 
s’occupe que de « coopérations concrètes » et on 
fait l’impasse sur les désaccords – elle s’est fra-
cassée sur l’écueil du conflit israélo-palestinien. 
Aujourd’hui les transitions en cours donnent aux 
Européens la possibilité de travailler dans des 
conditions nouvelles. Du point de vue bilatéral, 
la nouvelle donne peut certes bouleverser dans 
un premier temps le cadre de travail existant ; elle 
doit surtout le revitaliser, car les nouvelles équi-
pes au pouvoir pourront compter sur la rési-
lience déjà éprouvée des cadres euro-
méditerranéens. Les circonstances permettent 
aujourd’hui de réviser le contrat d’objectif noué 
avec chacun des pays de l’UM. La poussée dé-
mocratique devrait favoriser la mise en place de 
processus de décision plus participatifs et appro-
priés par les peuples des pays partenaires – ce qui 
nous donnerait enfin l’opportunité de surmonter 
l’inégalité intrinsèque d’un système où le Nord 
décide, tandis que le Sud se contente de gérer la 
rente d’une aide très peu conditionnée. 
Les contraintes fondamentales de l’action euro-
péenne restent certes les mêmes : travailler sur le 
temps long, organiser des partenariats de progrès 
en insistant sur les besoins fondamentaux en in-
frastructures de nos partenaires et en les aidant 
surtout à instaurer des systèmes de gestion éco-
nomique plus équitables et redistributifs. En Mé-
diterranée plus qu’ailleurs, l’économie est encore 
sous le contrôle du politique et non l’inverse – 
une contrainte qui offre dans l’immédiat des le-
viers d’action intéressants. Mais pour aller au 
bout de sa mission en Méditerranée, l’Europe ne 
doit plus renoncer à l’exigence démocratique. La 
convergence politique est en effet seule garante à 
terme d’une relation égale et apaisée entre  
l’Union et les pays partenaires méditerranéens. 
2 Répondre à l’urgence politique méditerranéenne  
Par Dorothée Schmid* 
* Dorothée Schmid est chercheur à l’Institut Français de Relations Internationales (IFRI), Paris. 
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Even before the Arab Revolutions put into ques-
tion the whole edifice of EU policy, the Union 
for the Mediterranean (UM) was already subject 
to heavy criticism.  
Two years after its creation, the UM had barely 
managed to establish the rudiments of a substan-
tial existence. The biannual summit of Heads of 
State and Government was postponed twice, the 
second time sine die. The permanent Secretariat 
lacked a proper budget, a programme and, since 
28th February 2011, even a Secretary-General. 
Last but not least, the North-South co-
presidencies never rotated – despite the initial 
commitment to do so.  
As for policy content, the six projects on which 
it was based (de-pollution of the Mediterranean, 
maritime and land highways, civil protection, so-
lar plan, Euro-Med University and the business 
initiative) made sluggish progress and were fre-
quently hijacked by the politics of the unresolved 
Israeli-Palestinian conflict.  
To many, the Arab Revolutions are the last nail 
in the coffin of an already moribund institution. 
Contrary to the depoliticized and technical na-
ture of the UM, they argue, the future EU Medi-
terranean policy should be highly political. At 
first sight, the new “Partnership for Democracy 
and Shared Prosperity”, although hastily arran-
ged and with many elements of continuity, 
confirms – especially with its emphasis on diffe-
rentiation and conditionality – this aim of re-
politicisation. By contrast, the UM projects 
sound awkwardly detached from the urgent 
needs and demands of the Arab peoples. 
In this context, proposals to revive the UM as a 
reaction to the Arab spring might be premature, 
to say the least. The time when it was acceptable 
to ignore the internal politics of our Mediterra-
nean neighbours has come to an end. And this 
ignorance was one of the main premises under 
which the UM was conceived: forget politics and 
proceed with projects. Still, it might be too early 
to discard it as an instrument for future policy. 
The UM remains an untested institution and the 
final outcome of the current turmoil is far from 
clear yet.  
It is worth reminding that the UM is not an 
EU instrument. It is a strictly intergovernmental 
body that, in the name of co-ownership, has gi-
ven non-EU member states equal footing in the 
decision-making process.  
If the EU takes a stronger stance in favour of 
political reform, with increased conditionality 
and unambiguous differentiation, some countries 
will be left behind or even excluded outright. In 
that case, an intergovernmental and largely apoli-
tical UM centred on technical projects could be – 
once its internal governance problems are solved 
– a way to keep the most reluctant Mediterra-
nean partners on board. Even in that case, howe-
ver, the deployment of fresher instruments – 
such as a Euromediterranean Development Bank 
or enhanced Euromed funding within the EIB 
and/or EBRD – might further empty the UM of 
content and purpose.  
The UM’s best chances of survival are therefore 
linked to a scenario of mild conditionality which 
would follow an only partially successful Arab 
spring. That the worst case scenario for the Arab 
peoples is the best-case scenario for not refor-
ming the UM, however, says it all. 
In the end, the most important consideration to 
bear in mind is whether the UM will be an impe-
diment for fresh thinking about the region. 
Equating the need for new initiatives in the Me-
diterranean with reviving the UM could lead to 
the same mistakes that placed the EU and some 
of its members on the wrong side of the divide 
between democracy seekers and authoritarian 
rulers.  
Therefore, since co-ownership is supposed to be 
one of its core features, what about waiting to 
have new democratic partners in the South and 
then letting them decide whether the UM res-
ponds to their needs and expectations? 
3 Are the Arab Revolutions the last nail in the UM coffin?  
By José Ignacio Torreblanca* and Jordí Vaquer i Fanés** 
* José Ignacio Torreblanca is senior Policy Fellow and Head of the Madrid office, European Counil of Foreign Relations (ECFR) 
** Jordí Vaquer i Fanés is Director of CIDOB, the Barcelona Centre for International Affairs. 
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The Arab revolutions risk tearing at the substance 
of European solidarity. As the EU struggles to 
reassess its Mediterranean policies, national differ-
ences threaten to reinforce a North-South rift that 
the euro zone crisis had already opened.  
North-South differences over the Mediterranean 
have been simmering for some time. Nicolas 
Sarkozy’s 2008 attempt to exclude northern 
EU countries from his “Mediterranean Union” 
precipitated a brief crisis in Franco-German rela-
tions, which have remained tenuous ever since. 
And quarrels over funding priorities between the 
Southern and Eastern neighbourhoods have 
grown increasingly bitter. 
However, the current split does amount to more 
than a simple division between spendthrift South-
erners and parsimonious Northerners. Meanwhile, 
a curious reversal of roles has taken place. In the 
early days it was the EU’s Mediterranean coun-
tries – led by France, Italy and Spain – which hesi-
tated and seemed to side with their client-regimes 
in North Africa, while many Northern countries 
surged to the aid of peaceful protesters. A few 
months on, leadership over EU policy has been 
re-claimed by a French-led Mediterranean coali-
tion seeking to outdo each other in displays of 
anti-regime fervour – while Northerners seem to 
be dragging their feet. 
Three sources of tension 
Indeed, on at least three issues Northern EU-
countries now seem to favour a somewhat differ-
ent approach than their Southern counterparts. 
First, when it comes to the reform of the ENP, 
most Northerners backed the proposals expressed 
in a February letter by German foreign minister 
Guido Westerwelle to Catherine Ashton. The let-
ter opposed a substantial increase in funding for 
the Southern neighborhood or a reallocation of 
funds from the Eastern neighborhood, as sug-
gested by Mediterranean countries. Instead, the 
letter proposed to terminate the ENP’s 7-year 
financial programmes and set aside as much as 
half of the ENP funding in order to reward pro-
gress on democracy and human rights more flexi-
bly. Other reforms suggested by Westerwelle in-
cluded opening the EU’s agricultural market 
(regularly opposed by Southern member states), 
support for education and student exchanges, and 
new channels of legal migration. 
Second, many Northerners have appeared more 
reserved about Europe’s role in the Arab revolu-
tions. The NATO-led intervention in Libya has 
been spearheaded by France and the UK with a 
broader interpretation of the UN mandate than 
some coalition partners’. Similarly, France (and 
later also Italy) broke ranks with the rest of the 
EU by recognizing the National Transitional 
Council as sole representative of the Libyan peo-
ple. France’s President has also threatened other 
Arab dictators with military intervention should 
they fail to heed popular calls for reforms.  
Northern European countries, by contrast, have 
tended to be more cautious about military inter-
vention and the EU’s role. Germany, most nota-
bly, abstained in the UNSC vote establishing a no-
fly zone over Libya, while Swedish objections 
have slowed down a potential deployment of the 
EU battle groups in Misrata. 
Third, intra-European differences over how to 
handle refugees have intensified following Italy’s 
decision to issue them temporary visas. Most 
North European countries oppose a sharing of 
refugees at European level. While they have 
agreed to take on some from Malta, they have 
refused to do so in principle elsewhere – trigger-
ing a bitter reaction from Italy’s interior minister. 
Managing all these North-South differences will 
not be easy. Ultimately, however, a successful 
EU policy will have to reconcile both points of 
view while breaking with the idea of “lead na-
tions” in our external relations. If anything, the 
substantial failure of the EU’s Mediterranean pol-
icy in the recent past has demonstrated the fallacy 
of granting too much space to specific national 
interests. 
4 Arab spring, European split? 
By Timo Behr* 
* Timo Behr is researcher at the Finnish Institute of International Affairs, Helsinki, and research associate at Notre Europe, Paris.  
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A Fresh Start in Egypt? Actors, Interests, 
Scenarios 
The assumption of power by the Supreme Coun-
cil of the Armed Forces, following President 
Mubarak’s ouster, could bring about Egypt’s po-
litical opening. The country’s future, however, is 
not solely dependent on whether the military de-
livers on its promises for constitutional amend-
ments, free elections, and the transfer of power 
to a civilian government. The opposition forces 
must also propose concrete visions on the coun-
try’s future political system. They must also orga-
nise themselves so as to feed their demands into 
the process. The report analyses the interests of 
the relevant stakeholders; their organisation and 
how power relations are shaped among them; 
and explores potential scenarios for Egypt’s fu-
ture. Given that international support will be ne-
cessary for a successful transition process, Euro-
pean policymakers are now faced with an oppor-
tunity to support genuine democratisation. 
http://www.swp-berlin.org/fileadmin/contents/
products/comments/2011C06_ass_rll_ks.pdf 
The Limits of Endless Revolution 
We should not exaggerate the possibility that the 
revolutions in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya will set off 
a chain reaction throughout the Arab world or the 
wider Muslim world. The activeness many expec-
ted to see from Islamic radicals has not been for-
thcoming. The Arab governments in Algeria, Jor-
dan, Morocco, Yemen and Oman have agreed to 
concessions and even dialogue with the opposition 
as a way of lowering tensions. We should not exag-
gerate the influence of these recent events on the 
Middle East conflict, because no matter what kind 
of government emerges in Egypt, it will concen-
trate its attention above all on domestic issues. Au-
thoritarian regimes in Central Asia are using the 
events in North Africa, especially in Libya, as an 
added argument in favour of a firm hand guaran-
teeing stable government in their countries. 
h t t p : //carneg ieendowment .o rg/ f i l e s /
MalashenkoBriefing_2011_March_ENG.pdf 
Morocco at the Crossroads 
The recent upheavals in the Maghreb and the 
Middle East, and the growing problems of poor 
education and high unemployment are likely to 
bring to the fore challenges in Morocco’s gover-
nance. Key concerns include the quality of institu-
tions, reforms aimed at promoting the rule of law, 
curbing corruption and overhauling the judiciary. 
This paper argues that while institutional quality is 
a prerequisite for successful and sustainable socio-
economic performance, this cannot be achieved 
without major reforms in the political system. 
There is a window of opportunity to accelerate 
reforms and address the acute centralisation of 
Moroccan politics and decision-making, the lack 
of accountability and the fragility of representative 
bodies. Seizing this opportunity could spare Mo-
rocco a period of instability, and ensure continuity 
in the transition that began in 1999. 
http://www.ceps.eu/book/morocco-crossroads-seizing-
window-opportunity-sustainable-development 
Rethinking the EU’s Mediterranean Policies 
Post-1/11 
This paper aims to explore the necessary rethink 
of Western policies towards the Mediterranean 
and what it entails for the European Union. The 
proposals in this study constitute concrete steps 
to review the EU’s Mediterranean policies in line 
with the Union’s fundamental rights and princi-
ples in its external action. In reviewing the Euro-
pean Neighbourhood Policy, the authors pro-
pose revamping the benefits on offer by reconsi-
dering the overall amount of funds made availa-
ble to the region for domestic development; re-
thinking the way in which such benefits and poli-
cy instruments are used and conditioned; exten-
ding the liberalisation of the four freedoms, par-
ticularly the free movement of persons and visa 
facilitation into the EU to citizens from the Me-
diterranean; establishing adequate monitoring 
mechanisms and engaging with a plethora of 
partners both within and beyond the region. 
http://www.iai.it/pdf/DocIAI/iaiwp1106.pdf 
5 Think Tank Twitter 
Think Tank Twitter (TTT) aims to provide regular information and updates on what is produced by think tanks and research centres across 
Europe (and beyond) on EU policy issues. As an analogy to the original Twitter, each summary – or tweet – does not exceed 140 words, rather 
than characters. Those who wish to signal new publications for possible inclusion can send them to the email address bepa-think-tank-
twitter@ec.europa.eu 
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What Not to Do in the Middle East and 
North Africa 
As political change and social protests unfold in 
the Mediterranean, lessons from other political 
transitions suggest a number of mistakes the 
EU should avoid in the remoulded region. Ten 
are mentioned in this report and include, among 
other: being precise on how and where money 
assisting political reform can best be spent. Too 
much emphasis should not be placed on backing 
local pro-reformists seen as the most promising, 
moderate and charismatic short-term. Transi-
tions should not be too heavily approached 
through the lens of deal-making between elites. 
The EU should be aware at how easily perni-
cious state capture occurs in the wake of demo-
cratic breakthrough. It should also not think that 
the all-encompassing export of the EU acquis 
will necessarily help democratisation and assist 
the development of political parties. 
http://www.fride.org/publication/895/what-not-to-do-
in-the-middle-east-and-north-africa 
Migratory Flows from North Africa: Challen-
ges for the EU 
Unprecedented flows of migrants are arriving on 
the EU’s southern shores following recent politi-
cal upheaval across North Africa and it is feared 
more will follow. The authors outline three chal-
lenges the EU and its Member States must cope 
with: the capacity to protect their borders, the 
capacity to respect the human rights of those 
fleeing persecution, and the capacity to exercise 
solidarity. While there is already evidence of a 
capacity to react when it comes to securing bor-
ders, the authors argue that Member States will 
now also have to demonstrate their ability to re-
spect human rights when managing large migra-
tion flows from the south, and meaningful soli-
darity both with countries in the North African 
region and with EU countries struggling to cope 
with the new arrivals. 






European Foreign Policy Scorecard 2010 
This first comprehensive assessment examines 
how Member States and EU institutions have 
contributed to the successes and failures of Eu-
rope’s performance in foreign policy. It demons-
trates how preoccupation with the economic cri-
sis has led to the marginalisation of foreign poli-
cy in national capitals. The Scorecard grades Eu-
rope’s ability to project its influence abroad on 
six themes: relations with China, the USA, Russia 
and Wider Europe, along with multilateral issues 
and crisis management. The EU’s best perfor-
mance ranged from partnership with the USA on 
terrorism to coordinating an international res-
ponse to Iranian nuclear proliferation, to helping 
’reset’ relations with Russia, to successfully aiding 
Haiti. A lack of unity among Member States has 
contributed to EU failings, including human 
rights in China; the Dalai Lama and Tibet; bilate-
ral relations with Turkey; and progress on Cy-
prus with Turkey. 
h t t p : / / w w w . e c f r . e u / p a g e / - /
ECFR_SCORECARD_2010_PDF.pdf 
The Treachery of Strategies: A Call for True 
EU Strategic Partnerships 
This paper congratulates the recent revival of 
debates on strategic partnerships and calls for 
the strict implementation of the 2010 September 
European Council conclusions. It recommends 
reflecting on the EU’s global interests and priori-
ties in search of an EU grand strategy. The paper 
recommends the EU and its Member States en-
gage in true strategic partnerships by reviewing 
the EU institutional set-up to establish a cell de-
dicated to strategic partnerships within the 
EEAS or ensure that the size and composition 
of EU delegations reflect the strategic character 
of the relationship; promote better coordination 
between the EU and Member States vis-à-vis 
strategic partners; establish comprehensive and 
effective strategic dialogues and sectoral dialo-
gues on security and defence with partners; re-
view multilateral arrangements by boosting 
conflict mediation mechanisms with strategic 
partners. 
http://www.egmontinstitute.be/paperegm/ep45.pdf 
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Arrivée 
Le BEPA souhaite la bienvenue à Ana Costa 
Freitas, expert national détachée du Portugal, qui 
rejoint l’équipe Outreach pour s’occuper du 
dossier de l’éducation supérieure. Mme Costa 
Freitas a une expérience considérable en matière 
de gestion dans le monde universitaire au niveau 
national, y compris sur le processus de Bologne. 
Evénements 
Le 1er avril, le vice-ministre Lu Zhongyuan du 
bureau du Premier Ministre chinois Wen Jia Bao 
a présenté le 12e plan quinquennal chinois dans 
le cadre d’une réunion avec des représentants des 
DGs et des Cabinets. 
Le BEPA a participé les 4 et 5 avril à la quatrième 
réunion du réseau des instituts gouvernementaux 
de recherche stratégique et de prospective, à 
l’invitation du Centre d’études stratégiques (CAS) 
français. Ont participé également des instituts du 
Royaume-Uni, d’Irlande, de Suède et des Pays-
Bas. Cette rencontre visait à stimuler l’échange 
d’informations sur les programmes de recherche 
en cours et à débattre de thèmes d’intérêt 
commun. 
Du 5 au 8 avril, le directeur général du BEPA 
Jean-Claude Thébault s’est rendu au Brésil pour 
des réunions avec des acteurs étatiques 
importants tels que le bureau du Président, les 
ministères des Affaires étrangères et des 
Finances. Il a aussi participé à une table ronde 
organisée par la Fundação Getúlio Vargas / 
Instituto Brasileiro de Economia. 
Le 19 avril, le BEPA a participé à la 6e réunion 
du groupe de travail du projet ESPAS, qui s’est 
réuni afin de faire l’état des lieux sur le premier 
rapport EUISS et sur la coordination 
interinstitutionnelle ; planifier le deuxième 
rapport EUISS ; préparer les conférences qui 
sont liés au projet ; et discuter de l’avenir de 
l’initiative ESPAS après la fin du projet pilote. 
Activités à venir 
Du 3 au 6 mai, le directeur général du BEPA 
Jean-Claude Thébault se rendra à Beijing pour 
des rencontres bilatérales avec des membres du 
gouvernement chinois et des experts de think 
tanks. Dans le cadre de cette visite, le BEPA 
signera un protocole d’entente et de coopération 
avec le Bureau des Conseillers du Conseil des 
Affaires d’Etat (COSC). M. Thébault participera 
également à une conférence internationale de 
prospectives croisées pour la Chine et l’UE à 
l’horizon 2030, organisée par le COSC et la 
Délégation de l’UE en Chine. 
Le 3 mai, le BEPA rencontrera une délégation de 
la Fondation sur le Développement Economique 
(IKV), y compris des membres de la société 
civile turque. Cette délégation sera en visite à 
Bruxelles afin de contribuer aux discussions sur 
les relations entre l’UE et la Turquie qui auront 
lieu au Parlement européen.  
Du 22 au 24 mai, le BEPA sera représenté, au 
travers de son directeur adjoint Margaritis 
Schinas, à une conférence internationale qui aura 
lieu près de Washington, DC et portera sur les 
tendances mondiales 2030. Cet événement, 
organisé par l’Atlantic Council, le National 
Intelligence Council (NIC), le Bureau du 
Département d’Etat pour le renseignement et la 
recherche (INR) et la Fondation Stanley 
rassemblera des experts de laboratoires d’idées et 
des gouvernements d’Asie, d’Afrique, 
d’Amérique latine, Europe, Eurasie et Amérique 
du Nord. 
Le 30 mai, le Président Barroso sera l’hôte d’une 
réunion de haut niveau co-présidée par les 
présidents du Parlement européen et du Conseil 
européen. Des personnalités éminentes de la 
communauté juive, musulmane et bouddhiste et 
les communautés chrétiennes – y compris les 
églises catholique, protestante et orthodoxe – 
discuteront avec les trois présidents d’“Un 
partenariat pour la démocratie et la prospérité 
partagée : une volonté commune de promouvoir 
les droits et libertés démocratiques”. 
Le 31 mai, le BEPA organise, en présence du 
Président Barroso, la première réunion du 
groupe d’experts sur la culture dont la mission 
est de proposer des initiatives et des actions 
culturelles européennes dans le cadre du mandat 
du Président.  
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